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Chair’s Address 
 
  Greetings! I am happy to introduce a sparkling new Berita newsletter edited by Derek 
Heng of Ohio State University. After the successful editorship of Ron Provencher from 
Northern Illinois University, we had a bit of a lull in trying to figure out how to restart 
the newsletter. Thankfully, Derek volunteered to take over and what you now have is 
largely due to his hard work. 
 
  The objective of this new series of Berita is to provide a forum for scholars of Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Brunei to share short articles about politics, society, history, literature, 
and the arts that will be of broad interest, as well as to provide useful information on 
fieldwork, archives, conferences, and other such resources for the scholarly community. 
Thus, you will find both substantive short essays and practical information about 
Malaysia and Singapore. (Unfortunately, Brunei is underrepresented, and I encourage 
anyone doing research on Brunei to write for our newsletter.) 
 
  I will leave the introduction of the essays to Derek, but I will just conclude by noting 
that Berita is now experimenting with various ideas to engage our audience. There is 
much that can be discussed in these pages and to the extent that you find something 
lacking in this edition of Berita, we are most happy to hear from you. Therefore, if you 
have any projects or ideas you would like to contribute to Berita, please email me 
(erik.kuhonta@mcgill.ca) or Derek Heng (heng.5@osu.edu). We are especially interested 
in publishing articles, book reviews, or views from the field from graduate students.  
 
  Lastly, please note that our annual business meeting at the Association for Asian 
Studies will take place on Friday April 1 in the Honolulu Convention Center, room 309 
from 7:15-9:15pm. At this meeting we will also present the John Lent Prize for best 
paper presented at the previous meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. This is the 
first time we will be presenting this prize, which will now become an annual event. After 
the meeting, we will have out customary dinner in a Southeast Asian (hopefully 
Malaysian!) restaurant. 
 
  I look forward to seeing many of you in Honolulu! 
 
Erik Martinez Kuhonta, McGill University 
Chair, Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group 
Association for Asian Studies 
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Chair’s Address 
 
  I am pleased to report that at our business meeting at the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) 
conference in San Diego on 22 March 2013, the Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group (MSB) 
awarded the John A. Lent Prize for Best Paper on Malaysia, Singapore, or Brunei presented at the 
previous annual meeting to Thomas Pepinsky, an assistant professor at Cornell University.  Thomas’ 
paper “Tak Nak Mereform: New Media and Malaysian Politics in Historical Perspective” was selected 
to be the best of the fine papers read. The prize committee, chaired by Patricia Sloane-White of the 
University of Delaware, included Sharon Carstens and Cheong Soon Gan, a former recipient of this 
prize. 
 
  I am also very happy to announce that we awarded the Ronald Provencher Travel Grant for the 
first time to Trixie Tangit, a Malaysian doctoral candidate at the Australian National University.  
Her extended paper abstract “If you are Kadazan, then speak Kadazan: Negotiating the culture and 
politics of standard language versus ‘mother tongue’ language among Kadazans in Sabah, Malaysian-
Borneo” was selected to be the best submitted. 
 
  At the business meeting, chaired by Vice-Chair Eric C. Thompson in my absence, Patricia Sloane-
White was appointed to serve another year as the chair of the John A. Lent Award Committee.  
James Jesudson, a distinguished scholar and veteran MSB member, and Thomas Pepinsky, this year’s 
winner, will join Patricia on this committee.  It was decided that dues and donations for MSB for this 
year would be made through the AAS website.  I have been receiving reports of these payments from 
AAS.  Thanks for your kind support! 
 
  Discussions about how to enhance MSB communications were also continued at the meetings. It 
was decided that for the time being, at least, that we maintain both platforms: the MSB listserv and 
Facebook group.  Interactions and sharing has increased on both venues. I urge all MSB members 
and supporters to increase their active participation in discussions and sharing information in these 
media. 
 
 
Timothy P. Daniels, Hofstra University 
Chair, Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group 
Timothy.P.Daniels@hofstra.edu 
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Editor’s Foreword 
 
  I am pleased to present, after a period of hiatus, the Berita Newsletter for Autumn 2013. 
Appreciation is extended to the many contributors for their articles, comments and announcements 
that are included in this issue. 
 
  The theme of this issue is Malaysian politics and the role of ethnic identity and religion in society. 
2013 has been a tumultuous year in Malaysian politics. Following the dissolution of parliament on 
the 3rd of April 2013, and the Malaysian general elections held on the 5th of May 2013, there has 
been significant discussions concerning the implications of the voting patterns and electoral results, 
and what these data sets imply in terms of the development and trajectory of Malaysian political 
society henceforth. Two feature articles in this issue, by Kikue Hamayotsu and Amrita Malhi, 
showcase the diverse currents in these scholarly discourses, examining and postulating the 
implications on the institutional strategies and social trajectories of the key stakeholders in 
Malaysian body politic. 
 
  A key theme that has emerged in the series of discussions carried out on various platforms over 
2013 has been the issue of religion and its implication on identity formation and the operations of 
social groups within the context of Malaysia. Eric Thompson's summation of the MSB-sponsored 
panel at the 2013 AAS meeting at San Diego, entitled "Transforming Melayu Identities in Maritime 
Southeast Asia", demonstrates that identity discourse is still very much a salient part of everyday 
life, fluid in interpretation, presentation, and implication, and not just historic, but also in the 
present. 
 
  Along this grain, we are also delighted to include an edited transcript of Zainah Anwar's keynote 
speech at the AAS meeting at San Diego entitled "What Islam, Who’s Islam? The Struggle for 
Women's Rights to Equality and Justice in Muslim Contexts". In it, she draws the links, and 
contradictions, between the interpretation and presentation of Islam to women, to challenges 
confronting NGOs in the face of such interpretations and presentations in an Islamic society, and 
where the paths of reconciliation may lie.  
 
  This issue is perhaps the most substantial one we have had the honour of producing, and I would 
like to extend my gratitude to all contributors for a wonderful issue of Berita! 
 
 
 
Derek Heng, Yale-NUS College 
Editor 
Derek-heng@yale-nus.edu.sg 
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Members’ Updates 
 
 
Sharon Carstens (Professor of Anthropology 
and Director of the Institute for Asian Studies, 
Portland State University) will be conducting 
sabbatical research in Malaysia from Jan - May 
2014. The title of her new project is "Language 
Ideologies and Identities: Multi-lingual Chinese 
in Multi-ethnic Malaysia." 
 
Khoo Gaik Cheng (Associate Professor, School 
of Modern Languages and Cultures, The 
University of Nottingham--Malaysia) teaches 
film and cultural studies. She recently co-edited 
(with Julian C.H. Lee) a special issue for 
Citizenship Studies, “New Ethnoscapes and 
different forms of belonging in Malaysia,” Vol. 
18, No. 8, forthcoming December 2014 (based 
on a Wenner Gren Foundation workshop 
grant). She is also working on a book entitled 
Food, Space and Identity in Malaysia and 
Singapore with co-author Jean Duruz, and is 
helping to organize the Association of 
Southeast Asian Cinemas conference (Salaya 
July 2014). Her research interests include film, 
food and cosmopolitanism. 
 
Derek Heng was recently appointed Head of 
the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. The centre conducts 
research into the pre-modern and early modern 
history of Southeast Asia, with a special 
emphasis on trans-regional exchanges, state 
formation processes, and culture and identity. 
The centre is presently embarking on a digital 
humanities project. 
 
Patricia Hardwick (Fellow, Institute of Sacred 
Music, Yale University) is an anthropologist 
and folklorist. She is presently working on a 
monograph that investigates how mak yong 
practitioners, confronted with changing 
interpretations of appropriate Islamic practice, 
are actively adapting how they think and speak 
about traditional Kelantanese Malay notions of 
the body, the origins of illness, and their 
healing performances. A former Fulbright and 
Javits Fellow, Patricia has done fieldwork in 
California, Malaysia, and Singapore 
documenting how individuals negotiate ethnic, 
religious, and historical identities through the 
performing arts.  Her research has been 
published as book chapters and articles.
 
  
Prizes 
 
John A. Lent Prize (2013, San 
Diego) 
 
 
Prof. John A. Lent founded Berita in 1975, editing it for 
twenty-six years, and founded the 
Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group in 1976, 
serving as chair for eight years. He has been a university 
faculty member since 1960, in Malaysia, the Philippines, 
China, and various U.S. universities. From 1972-74, 
Prof. Lent was founding director of Malaysia's first 
university-level mass communications program at 
Universiti Sains Malaysia, and has been professor at 
Temple University since 1974. 
 
 Over the years, Prof. Lent has written monographs and 
many articles on Malaysian mass media, animation, and 
cartooning. He is the author and editor of seventy-one 
books and monographs, and hundreds of articles and book 
chapters. Since 1994, he has chaired the Asian Cinema 
Society and has been the editor of the journal Asian 
Cinema. He publishes and edits International Journal of 
Comic Art, which he started in 1999, and is chair of 
Asian Research Center on Animation and Comic Art and 
Berita	   5	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Asian-Pacific Association of Comic Art, both of which he 
established, and are located in China. 
 
 
 The Committee for the John A. Lent 
Prize for the best paper on Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Brunei presented to the AAS in the 
previous year has chosen as its winner Thomas 
Pepinsky, for his paper “Tak Nak Mereform: 
New Media and Malaysian Politics in Historical 
Perspective.” The three committee members all 
agreed that Pepinsky’s paper deserves special 
recognition for its compelling and persuasive 
argument and the high quality of its writing.  
 
 Thomas Pepinsky’s timely paper asks, 
as many scholars of the politics of 
democratization today do, if the technologies of 
new media and a broadening online society 
“augur well for political liberalization.” This is a 
particularly relevant question in Malaysia, 
where ordinary citizens and the country’s 
official opposition have successfully harnessed 
technology to undermine the incumbent 
“Barisan National regime’s organizational and 
informational advantages.” Pepinsky’s approach 
is striking because he places what is indeed 
“new” in Malaysia—the growth of diverse news 
media and a vibrant online society that flourish 
beyond the reach of state censorship and 
political control, as well as new tactics and new 
kinds of social actors—within what might be 
called the longue durée of six decades of 
Malaysian politics to demonstrate that the 
essential logic and deep structure of (and 
arguments within) Malaysian politics have not 
changed.  Thus Pepinsky argues that despite 
mobilization of new segments of society, aided 
by changes in the economy, society and 
technology, any fundamental reordering of the 
political structures that have underpinned 
Malaysian politics since independence is 
unlikely to take place. Until what he calls the 
“cleavage structures” that center on ethnicity 
and class fall away, new forces may appear on 
the landscape. But the terms and the result of 
the political contestation will remain, he argues, 
perniciously the same. 
 
 In this well-written paper, Pepinsky 
engages with multiple academic analysts who 
are more optimistic over prospects of 
realignment in Malaysian politics arising from 
the formation of new coalitions and new tactics 
within protest movements. He supports his 
argument with three well-chosen (and well-
known) examples of recent political movements: 
the Hindraf  rally of 2007, the March 2008 
General elections, and the 2011 Bersih 2.0 rally. 
Although other scholars might reach a different 
conclusion than his, Pepinsky’s perspective on 
Malaysian politics provides a useful framework 
for comprehending both the challenges to and 
the resilience of the current political structure 
and is important precisely because it sets the 
parameters for a necessary debate.  
 
 Finally, it gives the John A. Lent Prize 
Committee particular pleasure to note that 
Pepinsky’s paper addresses the relationship 
among what he calls the “emancipatory 
potential of new technology,” media, and social 
change, a topic that parallels and resonates with 
John A. Lent’s own research interests. 
 
 
Ronald Provencher Travel Grant 
(2013, San Diego) 
 
The Ronald Provencher Travel Grant is named in 
honour of Ronald Provencher, distinguished cultural 
anthropologist of Malaysia, a long-time leader of the 
Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei Studies Group (Association 
for Asian Studies) and editor of Berita Newsletter. It 
carries with it a US$750 award for a graduate student 
from Malaysia, Singapore or Brunei to travel to present a 
paper at the Association for Asian Studies meeting. 
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 The Malaysia/Singapore/Brunei 
Studies Group (MSB) has awarded its first 
Ronald Provencher Travel Grant to Trixie 
Tangit, a doctoral candidate at the Australian 
National University, for her extended proposal 
for the paper titled, “‘If you are Kadazan, then 
speak Kadazan’: Negotiating the culture and 
politics of standard language versus ‘mother 
tongue’ language among Kadazans in Sabah, 
Malaysian-Borneo.”  She presented this paper at 
the 2013 AAS Meetings on the panel, 
“Negotiating the Culture and Politics of 
Language Choice in Contemporary Malaysia,” 
organized and chaired by Sharon Carstens. 
 
 Trixie Tangit is a Malaysian from 
Sabah with a background in linguistics and 
experience working with local ethnic groups.  
She earned her M.A. in Linguistics at the 
University of Hawaii, Honolulu in 2005, and 
worked as a Research Officer on Indigenous 
Languages and Cultures for the Kadazandusun 
Language Foundation (KLF) Sabah, Malaysia. 
 
 Trixie Tangit’s extended paper 
proposal reviewed much of the pertinent 
literature about language use among Kadazans, 
which describes their language shifts to Malay 
and a ‘mixed language’ comprised of Malay, 
English, and Kadazan.  She used text analysis 
and ethnographic interview data to highlight 
Kadazan perceptions of linguistic elements, 
language ideology, and sites of identity, and to 
argue that Kadazans view the Kadazandusun 
language as ‘Dusunizing’ them.  This proposed 
research paper, an integral part of her doctoral 
research, potentially makes a major 
contribution to the literature by explaining how 
Kadazan language ideology articulates with 
ethnic identity and belonging in Sabah. 
 
 
 
 
 
Announcements 
 
New Film 
 
Di Ambang:  State less  in Sabah  follows the 
lives of two undocumented Filipino migrant 
families, one ethnic Suluk and one Bajau, living 
in the Malaysian state of Sabah. Fleeing conflict 
in the southern Philippines, thousands have 
migrated across Malaysia’s porous sea borders. 
Following the families through their day-to-day 
lives, this documentary explores statelessness 
and the consequences it has on the generations 
of people living unrecognized by any country.  
 
The website with the trailer can be found at 
http://diambangfilm.com/.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Conference Announcements  
 
Title:  Security, Sovereignty and Socio-
Economic Development: Asia-Pacific 
Island Issues in the Early 21st 
Century 
Venue: Penang, Malaysia 
Date: 1st & 2nd February 2014.  
Organisers: Institute of Ethnic Studies, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
(KITA-UKM, Malaysia) and the 
Asia-Pacific Islands Program at 
Southern Cross University 
(Australia) in collaboration with 
SICRI – The Small Island Cultures 
Research Initiative.
Berita	   7	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Special Report 1 
 
 
Competitive Elections and Ethnic 
and Religious Politics  in a 
transforming Malaysia 1  
 
(By Kikue Hamayotsu) 
 
 It is a well-established proposition in 
political science that it is difficult to achieve 
and maintain stable democratic rule in a plural 
society (Lijphart 1977). Some also argue that 
competitive elections, a minimal procedural 
condition in a modern democracy, could 
potentially generate more instability and 
violence rather than rectifying them in such a 
society (Snyder 2000). Regardless of who is in 
power, the challenges of maintaining delicate 
ethnic relations will remain the same in a 
deeply divided society like Malaysia.  
 
 In spite of extraordinary economic, 
socio-cultural and political transformations 
over the past decades, the basic characteristics 
of Malaysia’s “plural society” politics, and 
ethnic-based mobilization in particular, have 
remained remarkably the same (Pepinsky 2009, 
2011).  
 
 Will Malaysia’s increasingly 
competitive elections and more liable and 
assertive “multi-ethnic” opposition bring about 
more equality, equity and stability, as promised 
by the opposition coalition, People’s Alliance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 An early draft of this article was posted in 
Mandala: New Perspectives on Mainland 
Southeast Asia on May 17, 2013 
(http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/20
13/05/17/revisiting-democracy-in-plural-
societies-in-transforming-malaysia/). 
(Pakatan Rakyat, PR)? Will the democracy 
under PR be significantly different from the 
polity we have seen in Malaysia under the 
National Front (Barisan Nasional, henceforth 
BN) in terms of equality and equity among 
various communities? Have issues, ideologies, 
and institutions of identity, ethnicity and 
religion in particular, receded or increased as a 
result of more competitive elections? If so, 
why?  
 
 In order to address these broader 
questions beyond the immediate outcomes of 
the 13th General Elections held on May 5, 
2013, this essay seeks to place the recent 
political development in a broader perspective 
that pertains to the questions of identity, 
religion and ethnicity. The findings and 
arguments I present here are mostly based on 
primary data I gathered through fieldwork, in-
depth interviews and online research.  
 
 My primary findings suggest that 
ethnocentric and communal sentiments are in 
fact on the rise, especially among the 
traditional and religious elites in the Malay 
community. I argue that the rise of ultra-
nationalistic and antagonistic attitudes is the 
result of the expansion of an unprecedentedly 
assertive pro-democracy movement and multi-
ethnic opposition.  
 
 The pro-democracy movement’s 
emphasis on equal rights and equitable 
development for all Malaysians has threatened 
not only the party-dominant regime but also 
the pro-Malay principles and institutions, 
including sultans and religious authorities.  
The perception that the movement is 
dominated by urban-middle class interests, 
especially non-Muslim communities, also has 
contributed to rising tensions between the 
majority Malay-Muslims and the rest of the 
Malaysian populations.  The prospects for 
Berita	   8	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democratic transition and consolidation do not 
appear to be as bright as the election results of 
2008 and 2013 indicate.  
 
The political use of ethnicity and religion 
in election campaigns: political learning 
and ideological moderation  
 
 On the positive side, one finding that 
could be highlighted and commended in the 
recent election, GE13, is that the use of 
parochial ethnic sentiments and symbols for 
short-term electoral gains was not as 
conspicuous as some observers may have 
expected.  
 
 To be sure, there were ultra-
nationalistic (and frankly racist) rhetoric and 
claims circulated in mainstream media by pro-
regime forces, most famously Perkasa. 
Founded by the former UMNO politician from 
Kelantan, Ibrahim Ali, in the aftermath of the 
General Elections in 2008, Perkasa is 
committed to the promotion of Malay 
supremacy and privileges. However, this 
ethnocentric and xenophobic rhetoric and 
mobilization aimed at inciting ultra-
nationalistic sentiments has proven to be 
ineffective and counterproductive, as seen in 
the defeat of Ibrahim in his home state of 
Kelantan. Moreover, physical violence related 
to ethnic or religious divisions has largely been 
restrained.   
 
 Overall, the PR—as well as the ruling 
coalition—has been reasonably successful in 
overcoming and limiting narrow parochial 
ethnic and religious sentiments and agendas in 
running election campaigns. Instead, PR has 
focused on pragmatic—and universalistic—
values and programs such as equal rights and 
equitable development, clean and fair elections, 
elimination of corruption and money politics, 
and transparent and accountable governance 
(Pakatan Rakyat 2013).  The national and 
democratic vision based on equality and 
equality among all Malaysians certainly 
sounds good and has worked well to win more 
urban and young pro-reform voters. Alongside 
unprecedentedly active participation of 
Malaysian citizens in anti-regime movement 
and street demonstrations since 2007, this 
encouraging development seems to be evidence 
of growing political awareness and maturity, at 
least among urban voters who overwhelmingly 
supported the opposition.   
  
 Have such universalistic campaigns of 
PR worked for all the component parties to 
bring the impressive electoral showing for the 
opposition seen in 2013? It is helpful to 
carefully look at the broader voting patterns 
after the onset of the 1998-99 political crisis 
and the reformasi movement in order to better 
understand why ultra-nationalistic sentiments 
and antagonistic attitudes are on the rise 
among the Malay-Muslim community. The 
election results seem to suggest some 
interesting, and potentially worrying, patterns 
and dynamics.  
 
 First, as seen in the table (Table 1) 
below, the opposition coalition parties, namely 
the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan 
Rakyat, PKR), the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP) and the Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti 
Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS), collectively have won 
significant support in terms of the number of 
votes and parliamentary seats against BN 
especially in the last two general elections in 
2008 and 2013. In 2008, the ruling coalition 
has lost a two-third majority in parliament as 
well as five states in Kedah, Kelantan, Penang, 
Perak and Selangor.2 In 2013, BN suffered its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 PR has been removed from power in Perak 
after the election due to the defection of three 
assemblymen.  
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worst electoral result since 1969 when it lost 
more votes than the opposition. 
 
 Second, it is the predominantly 
Chinese 
DAP who 
has gained 
the most 
from the 
anti-
regime 
movement 
and has 
expanded 
its support 
base, 
although 
PR 
contested parliamentary seats under single 
tickets. In 1999 in the aftermath of the political 
crisis after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim, as 
seen in the table (Table 2) below, DAP won 
only 10 seats (27%) out of the 37 seats it 
contested in peninsular Malaysia (excluding 
the eastern states, Sabah and Sarawak). The 
result 
indicates 
that the 
reformasi 
movement 
and the 
declining 
popularity 
of BN 
(especially 
UMNO) 
had little 
to do with 
DAP or non-Malay voters. Since then, 
however, DAP’s growth in popularity is by far 
the most conspicuous among the three 
coalition partners. In 2013, DAP achieved an 
overwhelming victory winning as many as 31 
seats (81%) out of the 36 seats it contested, 5 
additional seats to the 26 seats it gained in 
2008.  
 
 By stark contrast, the performances of 
the other two 
predominant-
ly Malay 
partners were 
less successful 
than DAP in 
both in 2008 
and 2013, 
despite having 
contested far 
more electoral 
districts. 
PKR, led by 
the 
charismatic and popular icon of the opposition 
movement, Anwar Ibrahim, only managed to 
win less than a half of the constituencies they 
contested (49% in 2008 and 41% in 2013). PAS 
won only 23 (35%) out of 65 seats and 21 (33%) 
out of 66 seats they contested in 2008 and 2013 
respectively. Among those 21 seats it won in 
2013, 9 seats 
are in 
Kelantan, the 
location of 
much of their 
support base 
before the 
onset of the 
anti-regime 
movement. 
Overall, 
PAS’s growth 
in the post-
reformasi era remains modest despite the 
growing anti-regime movement. The limited 
expansion of PAS may be even more 
perplexing if we remember that PAS was the 
most viable alternative opposition party to 
Table 1: Number of seats and votes won by BN and PR (1999-
2013) 
	  
Source: The Election Commission of Malaysia; The Star Online: 13th 
Malaysian General Election; the author’s own data.	  
	  
Seats Seats	  (%) Votes	  (%) Seats Seats	  (%) Votes	  (%) Total
1999 148 76.68 56.5 45 23.32 43.5 193
2004 198 90.41 63.9 21 9.59 36.1 219
2008 140 62.61 52.2 82 36.93 47.8 222
2013 133 59.91 47.38 89 40.09 50.87 222
BN PR
Table 2. The number of electoral districts the opposition 
parties contested and won 
	  
	  
Source: Author's calculation based on the results available from the 
http://elections.thestar.com.my/.	  
	  
PKR* DAP PAS PRM
Contest Win Contest Win Contest Win Contest Win
GE10	  (1999) 42 5 37 10 60 27 4 0 PKR*=	  Keadilan+PRM
12% 27% 45% 0
GE11	  (2004) 47 1 38 11 83 7
2% 28% 8%
GE12	  (2008) 63 31 35 26 65 23
49% 74% 35%
GE13	  (2013) 64 26 36 31 66 21
41% 81% 33%
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UMNO up till the onset of the 1998-99 
political crisis.   
 
 Third, to make the already 
disappointing situation worse, so-called rising 
young “progressive” pro-reform leaders from 
PAS, Dzulkefly Ahmad, Mohamad Sabu, 
Husam Musa and Salahuddin Ayub, have lost 
not only in UMNO’s strong hold, Johor but 
also other states such as Kedah and Selangor. 
According to these results, PAS and its 
moderate and pro-reform leaders in particular 
are not gaining much ground in the urban 
constituencies despite their efforts to alter the 
old ultra-conservative outlooks and religious 
visions of the Islamist party.  
 
 With everything equal, these results 
may not simply be attributed to strategic 
miscalculation (e.g., a wrong candidate in a 
wrong constituency), electoral manipulation, 
or dirty tactics of the regime. DAP was able to 
defeat their BN rivals under the same adverse 
institutional and political conditions. Clearly 
PAS is not gaining many rewards from their 
position in the coalition, their new reformist 
identity, and the leadership they have chosen 
to adopt at the expense of their traditional 
Islamist identity, policies, and leadership. It is 
important to realize that PAS’s support base 
remains exclusively in Kelantan as it was 10 
years ago, in contrast to the assertion that it 
has been transformed into a more open and 
national party.  
 
 It is reasonable to conclude that the 
electoral success of the opposition coalition has 
much to do with their ability to appeal to more 
urban, cosmopolitan, and largely middle-class 
constituencies. As widely discussed elsewhere, 
BN, and UMNO in particular, has not lost 
much support in primarily Malay-dominant 
rural constituencies as much as its non-Malay 
BN partners have in their non-Muslim 
constituencies. Both in 2008 and 2013, PAS’ 
contribution to the opposition’s victories 
remain modest and obviously less than DAP’s, 
despite the fact that there are 
disproportionately more Malay-majority 
electoral districts that PAS (and PKR) are 
likely to contest.  
 
 A big question now is what would be 
an option for PAS. After the 2013 elections, 
PAS seems to be suffering from a sense of 
defeat, uncertainty, and urgency to reconsider 
its position in the coalition and Malaysian 
politics in general. The more conservative 
religious elites such as former deputy 
president, Nasharuddin Mat Isa have been 
regaining more force within the party, 
although they had been pushed aside as a result 
of their resistance against the new direction of 
the party (Hamayotsu 2010 ). On the other 
hand, some of the pro-reform party leaders 
such as Husam Musa and their close allies have 
been quietly pushed aside within the party 
structure. Are the political and ideological 
costs they are paying small enough for them to 
stay as they are? 
 
The rising pro-Malay-Muslim ultra-
nationalism and inter-ethnic tensions 
 
 It is still uncertain how committed the 
opposition parties actually are to their 
moderate outlooks and a national vision where 
all Malaysians are treated equally. The 
question looms large because, so far, the 
opposition leaders have agreed not to talk 
about delicate issues such as issues of ethnicity, 
religion, and equity. This agreement is meant 
to keep the parties together to achieve their 
primary and immediate goal, to oust the 
dominant party regime.  
 
 What is more concerning is the rise of 
ultra-nationalistic and antagonistic attitudes 
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among the Muslim-Malay community, 
especially traditional Malay and religious elites 
including sultans and state religious officials, 
which have led to inter-ethnic tensions since 
2007.  The trend is intriguing because it has 
occurred when the UMNO elites adopted a 
more accommodative and integrative approach 
to balance out various ethnic interests.  
 
 One of the most prominent cases 
includes violence and hostility that has 
intensified against Christians in regard to the 
use of the word Allah. Inter-ethnic tensions 
have arisen after the High Court ruled in 
December 2009 to overturn a government’s 
ban on Roman Catholics using the word as a 
translation for God in the Malay languages 
edition of their newspaper, the Herald. After 
the court ruling, a number of churches, a 
convent, and a Sikh temple were attacked 
across the country.  
 
 After the 2013 elections, inter-ethnic 
and religious tensions have deteriorated 
further due primarily to the Malay elites’ 
antagonistic and provocative attitudes against 
the constitutional rights and sentiments of 
religious minorities. The federal religious 
authorities, JAKIM, for example, called for a 
“jihad (holy struggle)” among Muslims against 
non-Muslims as the hearing of the appeal case 
on the use of the word Allah neared. Under 
such massive pressures, non-Muslim religious 
leaders are doubtful if the judiciary (dominated 
by Malays) could be impartial to the interests 
and predicaments of non-Malays. Indeed, at 
the time of writing, the Court of Appeal ruled 
unanimously against allowing the Catholic 
Church to use the word Allah in its weekly 
publication, saying that the government did 
not impugn on the Church’s constitutional 
rights in banning the use of the word.  
 
 It is in fact the ambiguity about the 
special rights of the Muslim-Malay community 
and the relations between majority and 
minority communities among the pro-
democracy movements, especially the PR elites 
that has put the traditional Malay and religious 
elites on the defensive. The unprecedentedly 
assertive pro-democracy civil and political 
societies and their emphasis on “equality” and 
“equity” are perceived as a threat to the 
cultural, religious and political dominance of 
the traditional Malay elites, even if the pro-
democracy movement is not explicitly 
demanding to reduce the privileges and special 
rights of Malays. Moreover, both UMNO and 
PAS are seen making too many concessions to 
the non-Malay communities to achieve 
electoral gains, while weakening 
organizationally. The fear that the Malays are 
losing powers and influence in a Malaysian 
society at large has contributed to the rising 
ultra-nationalistic sentiments and antagonistic 
attitudes among the Malay community, and 
traditional elites in particular.  
 
 The fear and antagonism among the 
Malay elites should be understood against a 
historical and institutional context of the state 
institutionalization of ethnicity and religion. 
The Malaysian constitution is based on ethnic 
and religious exclusivism so that the 
supremacy of the Malay majority would never 
be challenged. Numerous legal codes and 
bureaucratic institutions and regulations are 
tightly in place to perpetuate the ethnic 
divisions and to keep minorities inferior to the 
Malay majority. Additionally, the Malaysian 
state has reinforced the apparatus of religion it 
inherited from the colonial regime, including 
the Syariah courts and many other religious 
agencies that dispense generous public goods 
and services to increasingly pious Malay 
community.  It is the traditional Malay and 
religious elites who have benefitted 
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handsomely from the state institutionalization 
of ethnicity and religion (exclusively Islam) 
and expanded formal powers and authority 
under the pro-Malay regime.  
 
 The question remains if the votes cast 
for the opposition are based on a belief that the 
powerful and resourceful state institutions and 
interests based on ethnic exclusivism will be 
reduced when the opposition comes to power.  
 
 Or are these votes based on a tacit 
understanding that these institutions and 
interests—and the Malay supremacy—will 
remain intact and a new multi-ethnic regime 
will try to figure out a better balance than the 
incumbent BN among contending ethnic 
interests?  What do their power-sharing 
formulas look like?  
 
Constitutional freedom of individual 
citizens in a deeply divided non-secularized 
society  
 
 An even more challenging question for 
Malaysia is if a new and more democratic 
regime is able and willing to protect and secure 
constitutional rights and freedom of citizens 
which do not always come together with 
democratic rules and competitive elections in 
deeply divided and religious societies. If we 
could gain some insight from her Muslim 
majority neighbor, Indonesia, the future of 
constitutional rights of religious and minority 
communities may not be so bright even if 
Malaysia somehow attains a new regime and 
manages to reduce corruption to attain clean 
governance.  
 
 In a democratic Indonesia, Christian 
and Muslim minorities remain vulnerable to 
various abuses, intimidation, and 
discriminations both by state and societal 
actors, although the popularly elected ruling 
elites are equipped with more egalitarian 
national ideology and more secular 
constitution and legal institutions. It is 
speculated that electoral incentives in 
democratized and decentralized elections in 
part have facilitated the use of religious 
symbols and interests by opportunistic 
politicians (and religious actors), thereby 
leading to anti-minority mobilization and 
violence (Hamayotsu 2013). 
 
 In short, the competitive election and 
strong performances of the opposition 
certainly have threatened the predominance of 
the ruling coalition, BN and UMNO in 
particular, while raising the prospect of regime 
transition which was never considered possible 
a decade ago. It is undeniable that an 
unprecedented large number of the Malaysian 
electorates are tired of the BN’s decade-long 
undemocratic rule and are ready to try out a 
new leadership. However, we are not certain if 
and how many of them are in fact ready to let 
go of the fundamental features of ethno-centric 
state institutions and ideology that have 
sustained the incumbent regime for so long. If 
the votes cast for the opposition are based on a 
tacit expectation that the fundamental rules 
and state institutions will be unaffected, it 
remains to be seen what formula the opposition 
leaders intend—and are capable of—to craft in 
order to bring about a truly new Malaysia with 
equality and equity in a peaceful manner.  
 
 The bottom line is that changing the 
society and the regime is one thing, and 
changing the state is another (Slater 2012). A 
tragedy of Malaysia’s plural society is not only 
that it is deeply divided socio-economically and 
culturally, but also that the state and legal 
apparatus have been developed extensively and 
effectively to maintain these characters and 
structures based on ethnic and religious 
cleavages and exclusivism. A regime change in 
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itself will not automatically bring the powerful 
state down in order to advance a new deal for 
all Malaysians that transcends narrow 
parochial and emotional boundaries.  
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Special Report 2 
 
 
Malaysia's  2013 Election:  The 
Nation and the National Front 1  
(By Amrita Malhi) 
 
Winning an election may still be one of life’s 
great thrills, but the afterglow is diminishing. 
(Naim 2013: 1713) 
 
 If ever an election victory could be 
interpreted as a humiliation by the winning side, 
then the Malaysian federal election, held in May 
this year, was profoundly humiliating for the 
National Front (Barisan Nasional, or BN).  
 
 BN won government for the thirteenth 
time, and extended its uninterrupted hold on 
federal government in Malaysia. It also 
continues to hold a majority of states in the 
federation. In this sense, BN’s political 
primacy—as the sole government Malaysia has 
ever known—remains in place, in the nation it 
argues its predecessors brought in to being in 
1957 (Cheah Boon Kheng 2002; Hooker 2003). 
 
 Aside from remaining in government, 
however, BN has nevertheless had to reconcile 
itself to a new political environment, in which 
its domination of the architecture of ‘the 
national’ is no longer guaranteed. The polls and 
technics that group together within this new 
environment have generated much academic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This article is part of a longer journal article 
in progress, currently entitled ‘Malaysian New 
Media Campaigning: Cleaving the Nation from 
its National Front’. Please direct any comments 
or feedback to amrita.malhi@unisa.edu.au. 
 
commentary since May.2  Yet one feature of this 
recent election that remains undiscussed is the 
extent to which it reveals that BN’s hold over 
narratives of the nation’s past, present and 
future has weakened considerably over the past 
decade. Indeed, the May election has revealed 
that BN is no longer assured that it can 
smoothly weave narratives of its own history 
together with those of the nation’s development 
(Hooker 2003:Chp 1).  
 
 This effect has exposed a heightened 
level of contestation about how the nation itself 
should be understood—indeed, how it should be 
constituted—and this contestation is played out 
in several key national spaces in which political 
debate is conducted. These spaces include the 
federal parliament, in which BN relies on an 
electoral gerrymander to retain sufficient seats 
to form government; and the public sphere, 
which is characterised by the rise of the digital 
media and the erosion of older print and 
broadcast mediascapes (Surin 2010; Yeoh Seng 
Guan 2010). As a result, absolute parliamentary 
numbers aside, both spaces are increasingly 
fragmented, and are no longer BN’s exclusive 
domain. 
 
 The result is a new narrative instability 
in the public sphere, as control over the nation’s 
foundational discourses has palpably slipped 
away from BN. For example, it is no longer the 
sole custodian of the text of the national 
constitution, nor can it alone elaborate a 
doctrine of multi-ethnic unity in the service of 
development. This is because the capacity for 
intervention in these two narrative fields is 
intrinsically linked with access to three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For example, refer to New Mandala: 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/cate
gory/malaysia/; and Tom Pepinsky’s blog: 
http://tompepinsky.com/. 
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important enablers—which BN once appeared 
likely to control with impunity for the indefinite 
future. The first two of these enablers were first 
lost to BN in 2008, and the 2013 election 
confirmed these losses. They consist of the 
federal parliamentary supermajority, and 
control of every state parliament except for 
Kelantan. This year, in addition to these two 
facets of its power, BN also lost the national 
popular vote, shaking its narrative foundations 
even further still. 
 
 In this new political situation, BN is 
unable—for now—to make the very claim that 
has always been central to its very political 
rationale. This is the claim embodied in its 
name: namely that BN alone can unite a multi-
ethnic plural society, protecting each group 
from the others’ divergent interests, and acting 
as the sole legitimate channel through which 
national aspirations should be funneled (Mauzy 
1983). Indeed, the 2013 election result does not 
only illustrate the extent to which the nation 
identifies with the National Front which leads it; 
rather it also brings in to question the extent to 
which the National Front is able to identify 
itself with the nation it leads. 
 
 Barisan Nasional can no longer project 
its exclusive authority over the national 
narrative in the public sphere. This is because 
the erosion of its electoral domination carries 
profound implications for how BN, the ‘national’ 
front, projects its affinity with, and its authority 
over, the polity and the public known as ‘the 
nation’. The crux of these implications is that 
BN can no longer smoothly conflate its identity 
and interests with those of the nation; whereas 
the capacity to do so has been essential to its 
exercise of power for more than fifty years.  
 
 Granted, ‘power’ is impossible to 
quantify as an accumulation of elemental 
components. Yet in the contest of narratives 
embedded in Malaysian politics, BN’s capacity 
to claim that only it can represent the nation 
has been a critical feature of its modality for 
wielding it. This is particularly the case if 
‘power’ is understood very simply as ‘an arbiter 
of a menu of actions’ available to a national 
executive (Naim 2013: 619). As such, this 
erosion of power also underpins and enables an 
argument prosecuted since May by the People’s 
Alliance coalition (Pakatan Rakyat, or PR) that 
it, and not BN, now represents ‘the nation’. 
Now that it commands the national popular 
vote in addition to strong multi-ethnic 
credentials of its own—in addition to three 
state governments and the new media public 
sphere—PR, in its turn, currently possesses a 
greatly enhanced capacity for national claim-
making. In this dynamic, and at least for this 
moment, it appears that the nation and its 
national front are cleaving apart. 
 
Institutional Capacity 
 
 BN’s loss of access to the three enablers 
described above is of critical importance because 
of the multiple ways in which they enforce each 
other. First, it has now decisively, and possibly 
even permanently, lost its two-thirds 
majority—also known as a supermajority—of 
seats in the House of Representatives (Dewan 
Rakyat). BN originally lost this supermajority at 
the last election in 2008—the first it had 
suffered such a loss since 1969. This is therefore 
only the second period of time in the nation’s 
history during which BN has not held a 
supermajority. Indeed, this is the first time this 
has happened within the living memory of the 
nearly three-quarters of Malaysians who are 
younger than forty (Weiss 2013: 308-309). 
Further, the historic 2008 result saw BN win 
140, or 63 per cent, of 222 seats.  
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 This year, rather than make up ground 
this year as it had hoped, BN won only 133, or 
60 per cent, of 222 seats. The 2013 result has 
therefore taken BN back even closer to its 1969 
low point, when its predecessor, the Alliance, 
won only 77, or 53 per cent, of 144 seats. 
 
 In part, the significance of this 
supermajority has been found in the way in 
which it operates as a form of psychological set 
point; a base performance trend line beneath 
which confidence plummets in an increasingly 
competitive political marketplace. Without it, 
BN’s capacity to command parliamentary 
authority—even while still in government—is 
diminished from its previous peak, rendering it 
psychologically enervated and defensive as a 
result. The supermajority is also significant 
because of the relationship it has underpinned 
between BN and the nation’s constitution. 
Without an automatic assurance of two-thirds 
of the parliamentary vote, BN has also thereby 
lost its capacity to unilaterally amend the 
constitution.3 
 
 The loss of the supermajority, then, 
represents a loss to BN of the institutional 
capacity it once possessed to ‘[privatise] the 
rules and procedures used by a nation-state to 
keep control over the activities within its 
territory’ (Castells 2008: 81). This loss only 
underscores BN’s humiliation again: the 
constitution is the nation’s founding document, 
statement of fundamental principles, and an 
operating manual for the polity. It was drawn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Article 159 of the Constitution allows for its 
revision if amendments are supported by ‘the 
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of members’ in either House of 
Parliament. For more details, refer to (2010). 
Federal Constitution: Reprint. Kuala Lumpur, The 
Commissioner of Law Revision Malaysia. 
up by BN’s predecessors, alongside British 
administrators and members of Malaysia’s 
various royal families (Cheah Boon Kheng 2002; 
Hooker 2003; Sham Saleem Faruqi 2008). 
Parliamentary supermajority, the constitution, 
and BN have therefore existed in symbiosis 
until very recently, and BN has held unchecked 
power over both institutions as a result. Indeed, 
according to one recent estimate, BN has 
invoked its supermajority to author more than 
700 amendments to the constitution over the 
years since independence (Adilah R.A. Nasir 
2013). Now that it can no longer make such 
amendments on its own, it can no longer adjust 
the nation’s textual foundations to reconfigure 
how the polity operates, whenever it judges this 
option expedient. This is a significant blow to 
BN’s narrative-making power. 
 
 BN’s second important loss is that it 
can no longer claim to function as a force that 
unites discrete ethnic groups, each possessing 
distinct, and divergent, interests. This is 
because, in federal parliamentary terms, BN is 
now barely a multi-ethnic coalition of parties at 
all. Of its three component parties, the 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) are now 
barely represented in the federal parliament at 
all, having won only seven and four seats 
respectively. As a result, the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) now dominates 
BN, holding 88 of its 133 seats (Suruhanjaya 
Pilihan Raya Malaysia 2011). BN is also now 
closely identified with the Malay supremacist 
organisation, Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa 
Malaysia (Perkasa), whose membership largely 
overlaps with that of UMNO (Chin 2012: 272). 
Perkasa serves a dual purpose for UMNO. It is 
both an external body to which UMNO can 
outsource its more provocative ethnic wedge 
campaigns (Malhi 2010); and a pressure group 
constituted both inside and outside UMNO, 
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which asserts a chauvinistic pressure on 
UMNO leaders when they make their political 
calculations (Welsh 2013). 
 
 Second, in addition to this result in the 
federal parliament, BN no longer commands 
institutional capacity in relation to the 
resources and machineries associated with the 
state governments of largely-urban Selangor 
and Penang. Its loss of these diverse economic 
and demographic hubs has also dented its 
capacity to claim that it alone embodies and 
represents the multi-racial national public. As a 
result, BN can no longer claim that it alone can 
bring this public together to overcome 
imminent racial strife, guiding it instead toward 
a common good: economic development. 
Further, now that it can no longer make this 
claim, it can also no longer write off largely-
rural, agrarian and Malay Muslim-dominated 
Kelantan—the only state it has failed to hold 
for nearly the entire period since 
independence—as an anomaly (Roff 1974; 
Kessler 1978). Under the leadership of former 
Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad (1981-
2003), for example, BN used to frequently make 
both these claims to characterise support for 
political alternatives as evidence of religious 
fanaticism and anti-development stupidity 
(Malhi 2003). 
 
 Third, a new loss of institutional 
capacity, freshly inflicted by voters in May this 
year, has also further eroded BN’s power over 
the narrative it has constructed of the nation’s 
foundation and subsequent development. This 
was the critically important loss of the popular 
vote, for the first time ever since the nation 
came in to being. Despite winning government 
by winning a majority of parliamentary seats, 
BN won only 47 per cent of votes cast. Even in 
1969, the first election in which BN (in its 
previous avatar, the Alliance) lost its 
supermajority, the only government the nation 
has ever known was still returned with 51 per 
cent of the popular vote (Nohlen, Grotz et al. 
2001). This new development also affects BN’s 
capacity to project its narrative in the public 
sphere. For one, this is because it entirely 
exposes the importance of the rural 
gerrymander in ensuring BN wins sufficient 
seats in parliament, even while its vote has 
fallen so far in percentage terms. Granted, BN 
maintains a distinct advantage in rural seats in 
which demographic and political tendencies 
favour the operations of its campaign machinery, 
namely certain of those known to largely 
consist of Malay Muslim voters (Aspinall 2013). 
Nevertheless, as one recent analysis 
demonstrates, the gap in population size 
between the largest and the smallest electoral 
constituencies in Malaysia has grown steadily 
since 1972, and as a result, the number of seats 
dominated by Malay Muslim voter populations 
now comprises 75.2 per cent of the total seats 
(Lee Hock Guan 2013: 8). 
 
 BN’s loss of the popular majority vote 
also holds a deep narrative significance because 
the 2013 result was not followed by ethnic 
violence, as the 1969 election result was, 
although that result was characterised by a loss 
to BN of the supermajority alone, and not the 
popular vote as well. Nor did the 2008 result 
lead to violence, when the supermajority was 
first lost for this, the second time. That violence 
did not occur does not concord with the BN-
propagated narrative of national and inter-
ethnic instability being the most likely result of 
voters rejecting their permanent domination of 
the federal parliament. Indeed, it is for this 
reason that the question of violence, similar to 
that which occurred in 1969, has been posed by 
media commentators at every election since 
Pakatan Rakyat’s emergence as an opposition 
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coalition, in successive iterations, since 1999.4 
Most Malaysians today, however, do not 
remember 1969, and it seems that recent 
election results have done little to remind them 
of it. This was despite Kuala Lumpur being on 
high alert on the night of 5 May—election 
night; with police check points established on 
the deserted freeways leading in and out of 
Kuala Lumpur, and a ban imposed on politically 
partisan pedestrian and vehicular convoys.5 
 
National Claim-Making 
 
 The new media has emerged as a 
relatively free and open aspect of a global public 
sphere in which Malaysians—regardless of 
where they might live—participate to produce 
and shape alternative narratives of the nation 
and its trajectory (Castells 2008). Due to BN’s 
lack of institutional capacity for maintaining 
national structures of control around the new 
public sphere, its capacity for national claim-
making is weakened. As a result, a genuine 
recovery of alternative narratives appears to be 
gathering pace, and these narratives are 
increasingly recovered as forms of national 
memory inscribed within digital networks, in 
addition to functioning as campaign narratives 
for Pakatan Rakyat. This recovery is afforded 
not only by the relative freedom of the new 
public sphere, but also by the increasing levels 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Refer, for one example from the many surely 
which abound, to an interview I gave to Radio 
2SER in Sydney. It is available at 
http://www.2ser.com/component/k2/item/33
58-the-daily-3rd-may-2013-malaysians-heads-
to-the-polls. 
5 From personal observation of driving on the 
Federal Highway and the New Pantai 
Expressway, in and out of the Lembah Pantai 
electorate, centred on Bangsar on Kuala 
Lumpur’s southwest boundary. 
of experience, and indeed professionalisation, 
commanded by certain sections of its 
participants. It is therefore in the new media 
public sphere that BN has most obviously 
suffered a major blow to its capacity to conflate 
its identity and interests with those of the 
nation, especially since losing its exclusive 
access to the other political enablers discussed 
above.  
 
 These alternative national claims are 
the subject of the full-length article that 
expands on this half-length contribution to 
Berita. Some of these claims operate as advances 
on the institutional capacity inherent in the 
legacy of the original constitution (Khoo 2013). 
Others constitute assertions that PR ‘won the 
election’, only to be blocked by the electoral 
gerrymander and the Election Commission.6 
Others function to withdraw from BN the 
multi-ethnic currency which comes with 
holding the nation’s diverse population centres, 
accusing BN of anachronism and racism instead 
(Malhi 2013). Additional claims serve to 
differentiate the ‘national’ public—that of 
Malaysian citizen-voters—from the extra-
national ‘constitutive outside’ populated by 
foreign workers. These workers included the 
‘planeloads’, or ‘40,000’ Bangladeshis alluded to 
in the ‘get out the vote’ campaign run by PR, 
the Sarawak Report and campaign pressure 
group, Anyone But UMNO, along with the 
electoral reform NGO, Bersih. 
 
 Ultimately, these new national claims 
are also accompanied by an urge by sections of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For example, refer to recent comments to this 
effect by Pakatan Rakyat’s Dato’ Seri Anwar 
Ibrahim at the Adelaide Festival of Ideas in 
October this year: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KESZYyzz
_MA.  
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the pro-PR activist public to recover, 
memorialise and celebrate alternative 
possibilities extant in the period of the national 
liberation struggle, when alternative 
trajectories for Malaya and Malaysia appeared 
possible. This urge was evident in the social 
media circulation in September of images of 
young activists displaying the Sang Saka 
Malaya flag—a red and white standard 
popularised by the 1940s Left, illegalised by the 
Emergency Declaration of 1948. The flag is 
controversial because it invokes a historical 
vision of Malaysia as a republic, and appears to 
blend the national flags of Singapore and 
Indonesia.7  This urge was again evident in the 
social media circulation of images, videos and 
debating points after the funeral of Chin Peng, 
leader of the Malayan Communist Party, in 
Bangkok in September.8 
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Feature Article 
 
Transforming Melayu Identities  
in Maritime Southeast  Asia  
(By Eric Thompson) 
 
Report :  MSB-Sponsored Panel  (San Diego 
2013)  
 
Alexander R. Arifianto (University of Miami) 
Patricia Ann Hardwick (Independent Scholar) 
Ronit Ricci (Australian National University) 
Patricia Sloane-White (University of Delaware) 
Eric C. Thompson (National University of 
Singapore) 
 
Melayu (or in English, “Malay”) has 
been a signifier of identity for well over a 
thousand years in the realm of Maritime 
Southeast Asia. For at least as long as modern 
scholarship has existed in the Malay world (or 
Alam Melayu) the polyvalence of Melayu-
inspired reflection on its meaning and 
significance – for instance in the works of the 
nineteenth century author Munshi Abdullah. In 
just the past decade, at least two important 
volumes of collected essays have interrogated 
the multiple instantiations of Melayu past and 
present (Tim Barnard, ed. Contesting Malayness: 
Malay Identity across Boundaries, 2004; Maznah 
Mohamad and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, 
eds. Melayu: The Politics, Poetics and Paradoxes of 
Malayness, 2011). The 2013 MSB Sponsored 
Panel at the Association for Asian Studies built 
on this critical engagement with Melayu 
identities, by offering three new case studies 
and two conceptual papers aimed at furthering 
the field of Malay Studies. The panel was 
organized by Patricia Sloane-White and 
Patricia Hardwick, who both contributed papers 
to the panel. Three additional papers were 
presented by Alexander R. Arifianto, Ronit 
Ricci and myself (Eric C. Thompson). 
 
I was also asked to act as a discussant 
for the panel. Given the full set of five papers 
and the presence of a large and engaged 
audience, in the event, I deferred my 
discussant’s comments in order to allow 
substantial time for questions, answers and 
discussion with the audience in attendance. It is 
thus my pleasure to take this opportunity to 
discuss the panel here in the pages of Berita. I 
begin by discussing my own paper and 
Arifianto’s, which both lay out conceptual and 
methodological research agendas; then turn to 
those of Sloane-White, Hardwick and Ricci, 
each of which provided rich ethnographic cases 
in which Melayu is an important, if contested, 
term in the present. 
 
Thompson’s paper (my own) was 
entitled “Thinking through Islam and de-
racializing Melayu.” The paper presented at the 
conference laid the groundwork for thinking 
through how application of certain Quranic and 
Arabic terms to the concept of Melayu might 
challenge the racialization of that term which 
occurred through the colonial and postcolonial 
nationalist period – from the 18th and 19th 
centuries into the present. Drawing mainly on 
the mainstream English-language cannon of 
Malay studies – authors such as Milner, Roff, 
Nagata and others – the paper traced the broad 
historical shifts in Melayu over fourteen or more 
centuries. The main point of this narrative was 
to demonstrate the shifting signification of 
Melayu, for example from a toponym (place-
name) to ethnonym (name for people) and 
across different points of reference of describing 
a people, such as in place, polity, religion, 
ethnicity or race. This history reminds us that 
Melayu is a floating signifier par excellance. To 
put it simply, the term Melayu has held powerful 
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resonance over more than a dozen centuries 
despite (or perhaps because of) the place or 
people to which it refers has been elusive and 
unstable. 
 
Drawing on this historical context, 
which points to the ways in which Melayu has 
conceptually shifted over time, the paper turned 
to two proposals for thinking about how 
contemporary Islamic discourse in Malaysia 
might be brought to bear on re-conceptualizing 
and specifically de-racializing Malayu. First, the 
paper challenged the implicit notion found in 
English-language scholarship that the hybrid 
sign Malay-Muslim could or should be 
disentangled. Rather, we need to “examine their 
integration and how the configuration and 
meanings of Malay influence and intersect with 
the meanings of Muslim and vice versa.” Second, 
we should think through how terms drawn 
from Quranic and Arabic sources might lead to 
different ways of thinking about Melayu – in 
particular, what might the consequences be of 
thinking in terms of an umat Melayu as opposed 
to bangsa (from Sanskrit) or ras (from English). 
The former, the paper suggests, is a more open 
system of relationship whereas both bangsa and 
ras are closed systems based on blood ties. Of 
course, at this stage, these remain suggestions 
to be more fully developed through further 
research and theorization. 
 
Arifianto’s paper, “Changing Malay-
Indonesian political identity in the early 21st 
century,” similarly laid out a rationale and 
framework for further research. Arifianto 
outlined the historical role that Malay-
Indonesians, as the second largest ethnic group 
after Javanese, have played in the social, 
economic and political affairs of pre- and post-
independence Indonesia. The paper provided an 
overview of many contributions of Malay 
individuals in the context of anti-colonial 
struggles and early nation building. Arifianto 
argued that while these contributions are well 
documented in the Indonesian past, over the 
past few decades there is an apparent silence 
with regard to ongoing contributions of Malay-
Indonesians into the present. 
 
To address this silence, Arifianto 
outlined a plan of research – through archival 
and textual materials, interviews and surveys – 
to develop a better body of knowledge about the 
place and endeavors of Malay-Indonesians in 
more recent history and up to the present. On 
the one hand, such a project would highlight 
contributions of individuals who identify as 
Malay within Indonesia. More broadly, it would 
shed light on the meaning of Melayu in 
contemporary Indonesia, which might go 
beyond mere reference to Melayu as one among 
a multitude of ethnic groups within Indonesia. 
 
Sloane-White’s “Interrogating 
Malayness: Islamic Transformations in the 
Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) Cohort” 
was the first of three case studies presented in 
the panel. Sloane-White reported on follow-up 
research to her 1990s work on Malay 
entrepreneurialism. In this more recent work, 
she has interacted with a more recent cohort of 
MCKK old-boys. The earlier cohorts of MCKK 
old boys identified with a particular brand of 
Malay nationalism, which formed the 
ideological basis for building Malay business 
networks with strong ties to the Malaysian 
government under the NEP from the 1970s 
into the 1990s. The more recent cohort of 
MCKK old-boys Sloane-White came to know – 
who she calls ‘outlier’ old-boys – reject the 
Malay-centered identity of the earlier cohorts in 
favor of a more explicitly and exclusively 
Muslim identity. 
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The paper argues that these Muslim-
identified old-boys are forming their own 
networks with strong Islamic sensibilities 
through which they distinguish themselves 
from and reject the values and business 
practices of the NEP-era Malay or bumiputera 
entrepreneurs. Sloane-White traces the 
distinctive practices which distinguish these 
newer, Muslim-identified entrepreneurs and 
how they form networks in competition to the 
older MCKK old-boy networks. At the same 
time, she also argues that there are substantial 
overlaps in these competing networks and 
highlights certain ambivalences which throw 
into question whether or not these networks 
and the Islamic business ethics that underwrite 
them auger substantive change in Malaysia’s 
capitalist, developmental, and growth-oriented 
political-economy. 
 
In similar fashion, but in a far different 
domain, Patricia Hardwick drew on recent 
research in Singapore to discuss the contested 
place of kuda kepang or hobby-horse trance 
dance among contemporary Malay popular and 
performing arts. Hardwick records that kuda 
kepang is a flourishing practice in Singapore, 
with the number of dance groups growing from 
eight in the 1980s to somewhere between 40 
and 60 at present with around 1,500 
practitioners. In addition to describing the 
dance itself, the paper provides ethnographic 
vignettes of the sort of negotiations that go on 
between practitioners, neighbors and the 
authorities, particularly the police and the 
Majlis Ugama Isalm Singapura (MUIS, 
Singapore Islamic Religious Council). 
 
One way to read Hardwick’s account is 
as an example of how practices from outside of 
Islamic history and tradition are brought into 
alignment with Islamic value. In general, they 
are acceptable if they are not against Islamic 
values; but such acceptability must always be 
negotiated. In the present, while MUIS 
authorities have objected to at least some 
elements of the kuda kepang, Hardwick 
demonstrates various ways in which 
practitioners synthesize kuda kepang with 
Islamic piety. At the same time, she emphasizes 
the ways in which the performance of kuda 
kepang material ground senses of Malay identity 
within cosmopolitan Singapore for its 
practitioners. 
 
Finally, Ronit Ricci’s paper provides yet 
another and relatively unfamiliar case of the 
instantiation of “Malay” in Sri Lanka. Ricci 
recounts the history through which Malay came 
to signify a particular group of people in Sri 
Lanka who are descendants of various 
individuals from the Indonesian archipelago – 
despite the fact that many if not most of these 
individuals might just as reasonably be 
considered to be Javanese, Bugis or other non-
Malay groups in Indonesia. In this regard, 
Ricci’s case might usefully be compared to 
Singapore or for that matter Malaysia, where 
many “Malays” are of Javanese, Bugis, 
Minangkabau or other descent, but have been 
incorporated under the sign Melayu; a point that 
Hardwick also makes. 
 
 The other particularly interesting part 
of Ricci’s paper, which could be developed 
further, is the way in which “Malay” has been 
mobilized politically by this group of people 
who want to carve out a space for themselves as 
distinct from the more general category of 
“Muslim.” Whereas in Malaysia and Singapore, 
the terms Malay and Muslim have come to be 
thought of as nearly synonymous, in Sri Lanka, 
Malay has developed as a distinctive ethnonym 
within a larger community of Muslims. Yet 
again, we see the ways in which the notion of 
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Malay or Melayu functions as a floating signifier 
not only in the past by into the present. 
 
 One might think, in light of the edited 
volumes mentioned above and a wealth of other 
scholarship past and present that all that could 
be said about Malay and Melayu has been said; 
but the papers presented here as well as the 
lively reception they received at the March 
2013 Association for Asian Studies Meeting 
demonstrate that this is far from the case. 
These, and certainly other work to come, 
continue to contribute to ongoing and changing 
understandings of Malay identities historically 
and in the contemporary world. They are one 
indication of the ongoing salience of Malayness 
in and beyond the Alam Melayu and the 
certainty that no time soon might Melayu, in 
Hang Tuah’s oft-quoted phrase, “hilang dunia” 
(vanish from the world). 
 
 
Eric C. Thompson is Associate Professor and Chair 
of Graduate Studies in the Department of Sociology 
at the National University of Singapore. He teaches 
anthropology, gender studies, urban studies and 
research methods. He has conducted research for over 
two decades throughout Southeast Asia, primarily in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. His 
research interests include transnational networking, 
gender studies, urbanism, culture theory, and 
ASEAN regionalism. 
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Speech Transcript 
 
 
What Islam, Who’s Islam? The 
Struggle for Women's Rights to 
Equality and Justice in Muslim 
Contexts  
(By Zainah Anwar) 
 
Keynote  Speech :  Association for Asian 
Studies  Annual Meeting (San Diego 2013)  
 
 
The setting 
 
 If God is just, if Islam is just, if Shariah 
law is supposed to bring justice, then why do so 
many laws, policies and practices made in the 
name of Islam lead to injustice and 
discrimination against women? This is the 
question that confronts women’s groups today 
all over the Muslim world and in minority 
Muslim contexts as we struggle to end 
discrimination against women, and face the 
challenge of patriarchs in government and 
Islamist groups who say that our demands for 
equality and justice, for law reform are against 
the teachings of Islam. 
 
 One of the most fundamental challenges 
we as Muslims face today is the search for a 
way to live our faith at a time when human 
rights, women’s rights, and democracy 
constitute the dominant ethical paradigm of the 
modern world.  In the twenty-first century, 
there cannot be justice without equality. It is as 
simple and undisputable as that.    
 
 As someone who believes that God is 
just, that Islam is just, I am outraged that so 
much injustice, cruelty, and violence are 
perpetrated in the name of Islam. I will not go 
into the long depressing list of outrageous acts 
against women and children justified in the 
name of Islam that occurs daily throughout the 
Muslim world.  You are all too familiar with 
them, and for us as Muslims living in the 
Muslim world, we live them on a daily basis.  
 
 Enough is enough. Muslim women 
today are taking charge, taking the lead to 
define how religion today is understood and 
practised and making our voices heard. We may 
not be wearing the hijab, we may not be 
speaking Arabic (only twenty percent of 
Muslims live the Arab world, as too many 
people often forget), we may not have a degree 
in some branch or other of Islamic knowledge 
from some Arab university, but we demand that 
our experience of living Islam and being 
impacted by laws and policies made in the name 
of Islam give us the right and the authority to 
decide and shape what Islam means and should 
mean in our lives and as a source of law and 
public policy.  
 
 It is because women have borne the 
brunt of this suffering in the name of religion, 
that it is us women who have organised and are 
at the forefront of our societies in pushing for 
change in our understanding and practice of our 
religion to recognise equality and justice and to 
push for law reform to uphold these principles.  
 
 But of course bringing change is never 
easy. Those who have benefitted from the status 
quo are resistant to change and use all kinds of 
tactics to demonise and delegitimize the voice of 
change.  
 
 Very often Muslim women who demand 
justice and want to change discriminatory laws 
and practices are told, ‘this is God’s law’ and are 
therefore not open to negotiation and change. 
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To question, challenge, or demand reform will 
supposedly go against Shari‘ah, weaken our 
faith in God and lead us astray from the 
straight path. We are often accused of being 
westernised elites, anti-Islam, anti-Shari’ah, 
women who have deviated from our faith – our 
aqidah, and our iman (faith) are weak. Reports 
are made against us to the police, to the 
religious authorities and to the Rulers as Heads 
of religion to take action against us, to silence 
us, to charge us for insulting Islam, to ban our 
groups, ban our publications.  
 
 I should share with you a glimmer of 
good news in this long struggle for justice. Just 
last week, Sisters in Islam won our case against 
the Malaysian Home Affairs Minister who 
banned our book, on Muslim Women and the 
Challenge of Islamic Extremism. The govt claimed 
that our book was a threat to public order as it 
confuses Muslims, especially women and those 
whose faith is shallow! We took the govt to 
court, we won at the High Court, the govt 
appealed, we won again at the Court of Appeal 
and the govt appealed yet again to the Federal 
Court, the apex court and the Federal Court 
threw out the govt’s leave for appeal. It was 
music to our ears when one of the judges, in a 
panel of five, that included two smart women, 
said the Minister was supposed to apply his 
mind to this case, he did not, instead he applied 
the mind of the religious authorities. 
 
 Why is it so difficult to acknowledge 
that women’s lives throughout the world have 
changed? Our realities, our needs, our roles and 
status have changed. For many of us who have 
decided to engage with the religion, it is our 
utter faith in a just God and a just Islam that 
have made us embark on this perilous, but 
compelling public struggle to push for an 
understanding of Islam that recognises the 
realities of our lives, and our yearning to be 
treated as human beings of equal worth and 
dignity. We believe these principles and the 
ideals of equality and justice are intrinsic in the 
Qur’an and are also upheld in universal human 
rights principles that regard all human beings 
as equal. What could be more Islamic than the 
first article of the UN Declaration on Human 
Rights, which states, “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights”. 
 
 There are numerous verses in the 
Qur’an that provide for an ethical vision of 
Islam, advocating the absolute moral and 
spiritual equality of women and men. Verses 
such as Surah 33:35 (on common and identical 
spiritual and moral obligations placed on all 
individuals regardless of sex); Surah 3:195 
which declares that men and woman are 
members, one of another; 2:187 which describes 
Muslim men and women as each other’s 
garments; 9:71, the final verse on the 
relationship between men and women which 
talks about them being each other’s ‘awliyya -
protecting friends and guardians - and the 
obligations for both men and women, to enjoin 
what is just and forbid what is evil, to observe 
regular prayers, pay the zakat (tithe) and obey 
Allah and his Messenger and they will be 
equally rewarded. These verses are 
unequivocally egalitarian in spirit and 
substance and reflect the Qur'anic view on the 
relationship between men and women. 
 
 This egalitarian vision also extends to 
human biology. The verses on creation of men 
and women talk about the characteristic of pairs 
in creation (51:49, 53:45, 78:8, 50:7, 22:5, 36:36). 
Since everything created must be in pairs, the 
male and female must both be necessary, must 
exist by the definition of createdness. Neither 
one comes before the other or from the other. 
One is not superior to the other, nor a 
derivative of the other. This means that in 
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Allah’s creation of human beings, no priority or 
superiority is accorded to either man or woman. 
 
 It is this ethical voice of the Qur’an, 
which insistently enjoins equality of all 
individuals that has been largely absent in the 
body of political and legal thought in Islam. 
When women decided to read the Qur’an for 
themselves, they discovered this ethical 
message of equality and justice in Islam. They 
began to question why this voice was silent in 
the exegetical texts of the religion and the 
codification of the laws. Who decided that these 
verses in the Qur’an willl be put aside? Why 
couldn’t these egalitarian and compassionate 
verses be used to guide the laws governing 
marital relations in Islam, while the verses that 
could be read as discriminatory towards women 
be the source of law and public policy? 
 
 In making these choices, whose 
interests are served, protected, and advanced 
and whose interests are shunted aside? Is this 
really about living the will of God on earth as 
these men in authority would like to dupe us 
into believing or is it more about how they 
could use the word of God to perpetuate 
patriarchy and resist the changing realities 
galloping before their eyes? 
 
The Challenge 
 
 The challenge we confront today is: 
how do we as Muslims reconcile the tenets of 
our faith to the challenge of modernity, of 
plurality, of changing times and circumstances? 
How do we deal with the new universal 
morality of democracy, of human rights, of 
women’s rights, and where is the place of Islam 
in this dominant ethical paradigm of the 
modern world? 
 
 The response to this challenge has led 
to various forms of discourses on Islam and 
rights. The discourse on women’s rights in 
Islam can be categorized into three broad 
strands: 
 
 First, there are those Muslims who 
acknowledge that Islam indeed liberated 
women and granted them rights unknown to 
any other society. They point out the Qur’anic 
injunctions that recognize a woman’s right to 
contract marriage, to divorce, to inherit and 
dispose of her property as she pleases. The 
Qur’an also outlawed female infanticide and 
enforced the payment of the dowry to the bride 
herself, not to her father or guardian. Yet, while 
progressive in tendency, this ethical vision of 
equality and justice for women in the Qur'an did 
not develop further or sustain any emancipatory 
or egalitarian thrust within the Muslim juristic 
heritage. Instead, the process of interpretation 
and codification of the laws, dominated by male 
jurists and scholars, eventually led to an 
orthodox mainstream view that men and 
women in effect are not equal. 
 
 In responding to the international 
discourse on women’s rights, such Muslims say 
that because men and women are not the same, 
there cannot be equality. Instead, they say that 
in Islam men and women complement each 
other and therefore what Islam recognizes is 
equity, not equality. What is meant is that 
because men and women are different, they 
have separate and distinct roles to play. This 
then leads to befuddled and contradictory 
positions. They believe in the equal right of 
women to education and to employment, but 
not, for example, equal right to divorce. 
Women can work outside the home, but only 
with the permission of their husbands; women 
can be doctors but they must not touch male 
patients; women can be heads of departments in 
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charge of men, but they cannot be in charge at 
home for they must remain obedient to their 
husbands. 
 
 The second strand reflects the 
obscurantist view that men and women are 
inherently unequal in Islam, quoting verses in 
the Qur'an such as 4:34 which talks about men 
being responsible for women and 2:228 which 
mentions that men are a “degree higher” than 
women. Such verses are interpreted literally 
and in isolation to legitimize men’s dominance 
and superiority over women. Other verses in 
the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet have 
been interpreted to mean that women cannot be 
leaders as they are weak and emotional, women 
cannot work outside the home as they are best 
suited to be wives and mothers in the service of 
others, a woman’s voice is part of her awrah and 
therefore cannot be heard in public. If at all 
women can be educated, that education is not 
meant for a career outside the home, but to help 
women to be better wives and mothers. 
 
 Over the past twenty years or so, there 
has emerged a contemporary Muslim discourse 
about women’s rights, human rights, 
democracy, and modernity - led by Muslim 
scholars and activists who advocate a review 
and critical reexamination and re-interpretation 
of the exegetical and jurisprudential texts and 
traditions within Islam. This work places 
emphasis on how religion is understood, how 
religious knowledge is produced, and how 
rights are constructed in the Islamic legal 
tradition. It locates the production of religious 
knowledge in the socio-historical context of its 
time and asserts that given changing times and 
circumstances, new religious knowledge needs 
to be produced to deal with new challenges and 
questions and issues that the tradition had not 
dealt with.  
 
 Foremost for Muslim feminists of 
course, is the issue of gender equality, of 
women’s rights. This was an issue that Muslim 
jurists never had to deal with until the late 19th 
century, and an issue that they are still 
grappling with over one hundred years later.  
 
 Today the idea of gender equality, 
which is integral to modern conceptions of 
justice, creates what can be called an 
‘epistemological crisis’ in the Muslim legal 
tradition. The moral philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre argues that every rational inquiry is 
embedded in a tradition of learning, and that 
tradition reaches an epistemological crisis when, 
by its own standards of rational justification, 
disagreements can no longer be resolved 
rationally. This, MacIntyre goes on, gives rise 
to an internal critique that will eventually 
transform the tradition, if the tradition is to 
survive.  
 
 I find this concept useful to understand 
and share with you what is going on today in 
the Muslim world where thinkers and activists 
are engaged in an internal critique in order to 
reform a legal tradition governing family and 
marriage that has lost its logic over time and 
the ways in which feminists and scholars are 
working together to construct new knowledge 
in Islam, to rebuild a tradition that is able to 
assimilate an idea once considered alien to 
Islamic legal thought.  
 
 This is a huge challenge of course, 
especially in the context of Muslim societies 
pummelled by the use and abuse of Islam for 
political purposes. But for those of us in the 
heart of this process of producing new 
knowledge in Islam, it is an exciting journey, 
intellectually, spiritually and politically as we 
battle for what it means to be Muslim and 
feminist in the 21st century.  
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The Path 
 
 Let me share with you the beginning. 
How and why did women's groups like Sisters 
in Islam and individual Muslim scholars, 
women and men, many of whom have been 
incredibly generous with their time and 
scholarship in helping us activists, decide to 
study the Qur'an and strive to hear the voice of 
the divine will speaking to our concerns? 
 
 Like many other women's groups, it is 
injustice, oppression and ill-treatment that 
mobilized us Muslim women. Sisters in Islam 
first got together because of our deep concerns 
over the injustice women suffered under the 
shariah system. As professional women and as 
activists, other women often approached us to 
confide their marital problems and the 
meanness they faced when they approached the 
religious authorities to seek redress to their 
problems. We got together first to look into the 
obstacles women faced in accessing their rights 
under the Islamic Family law. The difficulties in 
getting divorce, maintenance, a share of the 
marital assets, custody and guardianship of 
their children – all rights that exist under the 
law, but given the gender bias in the system, 
women face an uphill battle when their 
husbands decide to challenge them. This was in 
1987.  
 
 However, increasingly, we felt that 
dealing with law alone was not enough. We felt 
angry and powerless in the face of complaints 
by women that they have to suffer in silence in 
the face of advice from the religious authorities 
and hearing talks, again and again, in religious 
classes, over radio and television, where women 
were often told that men are superior to 
women, that men have authority over women, 
that a man has a right to beat his wife, that a 
woman must obey her husband, the evidence of 
two women equals one man, the husband has a 
God-given right to take a second wife, and 
therefore it is a sin for a woman to deny him 
that right, that a wife has no right to say no to 
sex with her husband, that hell is full of women 
because they leave their heads uncovered and 
are disobedient to their husbands. 
 
 Where is the justice for women in all 
these pronouncements? This questioning, and 
above all, the conviction that Allah could never 
be unjust, eventually led us to go back to the 
primary source of our religion, the Qur’an. We 
felt the urgent need to read the Qur’an for 
ourselves and to find out if the Text actually 
supported the oppression and ill-treatment of 
women. 
 
 This process Sisters went through was 
the most liberating and spiritually uplifting 
experience for all of us. We took the path of 
Iqraq (“Read", the first word revealed to 
Prophet Muhammad saw) and it opened a world 
of Islam that we could recognize, a world for 
women that was filled with love and mercy and 
with equality and justice. We need not look any 
further to validate our struggle. Women’s 
rights were rooted in our tradition, in our faith. 
We were more convinced than ever that it is 
not Islam that oppresses women, but 
interpretations of the Qur’an influenced by 
cultural practices and values of a patriarchal 
society that regard women as inferior and 
subordinate to men. 
 
 For much of Islamic history, it is men 
who have interpreted the Qur’an and the 
traditions for us. The woman’s voice, the 
woman’s experience, the woman’s realities had 
been silent and silenced in the reading and 
interpretation of the Text. The silence of the 
interpretive voice was seen as the silence of the 
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Text. But when Sisters read the Text, we 
discovered words, messages and meanings that 
we were never exposed to in all the traditional 
education on Islam that we went through in our 
lives. 
 
 For us, it was the beginning of a new 
journey of discovery. It was a revelation to us 
that the verse on polygamy (Sura an-Nisa, 4:3) 
explicitly said “…if you fear you shall not be 
able to deal justly with women, then marry only 
one.” Why is it that one half of the verse that 
said a man can have up to four wives becomes 
universally known and accepted as a right in 
Islam and is codified into law, but the other half 
of the very same verse that promotes 
monogamy is largely unheard of until women 
began to read the Qur’an for ourselves. 
 
 It dawned on us that when men read 
the verse, they only saw “marry up to four 
wives.” In that phrase, they saw the word of 
God that validated their desire and their 
experience of multiple sexual partners. When 
women read the verse, we clearly saw “… if you 
fear you cannot deal justly with women, then 
marry only one.”  
 
 Those were the words of Allah that 
spoke to our fears of injustice. We understood 
that the right to polygamy was conditional, and 
if a man cannot fulfill those conditions of equal 
and just treatment, then Allah said marry only 
one. In fact the verse goes on to say “… this 
will be best for you to prevent you from doing 
injustice.” What further validation do we need 
to argue that polygamy is not a right in Islam, 
but is actually a responsibility allowed only in 
exceptional circumstances? 
 
 The question that arose was obvious to 
us: WHO decides which interpretation, which 
juristic opinion, which hadith, which traditional 
practice would prevail and be the source of 
codified law in this modern world, to govern 
our private and public lives and punish us if we 
fail to abide, and which would fall by the 
wayside? On what basis is that decision made? 
Whose interests are protected and whose 
interests are denied? It was clear to us that the 
outcome of this process was more about power, 
privilege and politics rather than living the 
divine will on earth. 
 
 As feminists, as believers, and as 
activists living within a democratic 
constitutional framework, we decided to assert 
and claim our right to have our VOICE heard 
in the public sphere and to intervene in the 
decision-making process on matters of religion 
that must take into consideration the realities of 
our lives and the justice enjoined by the Qur’an. 
 
The Challenge 
 
 As we continue to study, to campaign 
for women’s rights, for the right for people like 
us who did not go to that venerable university 
in Egypt for the study of Islam, al- Azhar, and 
who cannot speak Arabic, and who are not 
covered up, to participate in matters of religion, 
we know the task before us is uphill. 
 
 Through our readings, through 
consultations and studies with progressive 
Islamic scholars inside and outside the country, 
through networking with other women's 
groups engaged in the same struggle, we 
claimed our right and created a public space for 
women like us to stand up and argue for justice 
and equality for Muslim women in contentious 
areas such as polygamy, equal rights, dress and 
modesty, domestic violence, hudud laws, and 
freedom of expression, freedom of religion and 
other fundamental liberties. 
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SIS Advocacy Work 
 
 Central to our advocacy work, is the 
creation of a public voice and a public 
constituency to recognise equality and justice 
between women and men in Islam, and 
consequently to demand for reform of laws and 
politics made in the name of Islam that 
discriminate against women. There are several 
strategies that Sisters in Islam used to achieve 
this:  
 
 From the start, we used the letters to 
the editor column in the newspapers to create a 
public voice for ourselves and our alternative 
understanding of various contentious issues in 
Islam – be it domestic violence, polygamy, dress 
and modesty, equality, leadership, etc. By 
challenging the traditional discriminatory views 
and quoting alternative interpretations and 
juristic opinions within Islam, and using legal 
concepts that enable change and diversity,  we 
hoped to engender a more informed public 
discussion on the issue and build a constituency 
that would support our advocacy and pressure 
the Government to take into consideration an 
understanding of Islam that upholds the 
principles of equality, justice, freedom and 
dignity.  
 
 Second, we submit memorandums and 
letters to the Government on issues such as the 
appointment of women as judges in Shari’ah 
courts, the right of Muslim women to equal 
guardianship of their children, Reform of the 
Islamic Family Law, Reform of the Shari’ah 
Criminal Laws, and the Administration of 
Justice in the Shari’ah System. 
 
 In these memorandums, we express our 
concerns on provisions in the law that 
discriminate against women in substance or 
implementation, or violate fundamental 
liberties, or conflict with the federal 
constitution and with civil law, offer a 
justification for why these laws should be 
amended or repealed and then provide specific 
wordings or positions to make clear the 
changes that we want to see take place. 
 
 We also have an extensive public 
education program where we conduct regular 
study sessions, training workshops on women’s 
rights in Islam all over the country. We also 
run a legal clinic that has served over 8,000 
women over the years, providing gender-
sensitive legal advice on matters under the 
Islamic family law and Syariah criminal law.  
 
 Our work of course has had an 
international impact. Our question and answer 
booklets on a range of issues, including 
equality, domestic, violence, polygamy, family 
planning, have been translated into other 
languages for use by women’s groups in other 
Muslim countries. We are also invited to 
conduct trainings on women’s rights in Islam 
from different parts of the Muslim world and 
build the capacity of Muslim women activists 
who feel the necessity to reconcile the teachings 
of Islam with human rights and women’s rights.  
 
 All this have of course led to Sisters in 
Islam taking the initiative to launch Musawah, 
the Global Movement for Equality and Justice 
in the Muslim family in 2009.  
 
 Given the frustrations and opposition 
Muslim women activists faced in trying to push 
for reform of the discriminatory Islamic Family 
law, we felt it was important that all us who 
have for decades struggled against patriarchs in 
government, society, and our private lives to 
recognise our right to equality, should come 
together and create a very collective 
international public voice demanding our rights 
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to equality and justice. Thus Musawah, which 
means equality, was launched in February 2009 
with over 250 participants from 47 countries. It 
was an exciting moment that until today we 
savour.  
 
 What Musawah hopes to bring to the 
larger women’s and human rights movement is 
this: 
• An assertion that Islam can be a source 
of empowerment, not a source of 
oppression and discrimination.  
• An effort to open new horizons for 
rethinking the relationship between 
Islam and human rights, equality and 
justice. 
• An offer to open a new constructive 
dialogue where religion is no longer an 
obstacle to equality for women, but a 
source for liberation.  
• A collective strength of conviction and 
courage to stop governments and 
patriarchal authorities, and ideological 
non-state actors from the convenience 
of using religion and the word of God 
to silence our demands for equality, 
and  
• A space where activists, scholars, 
decision makers, working within the 
human rights or the Islamic framework, 
or both, can interact and mutually 
strengthen our  common pursuit of 
equality and justice for Muslim women.   
 
 Of course by claiming our right and 
creating the space to speak out in public on 
Islam, we have made enemies. We are often 
criticised by conservative scholars and Islamist 
activists – a common experience of other 
women’s groups and progressive scholars in 
other Muslim countries. 
 
 The attacks and condemnations usually 
take three forms: first, they undermine our 
right and our legitimacy to speak on Islam by 
questioning our credentials. They say we have 
no right to speak on Islam because we are not 
traditionally educated in religious schools, we 
do not have a degree in Islam from a recognized 
Arab university, we do not speak Arabic, and 
we do not cover our heads. They say we are 
western-educated feminists representing an 
elite strata of society who are trying to impose 
alien western values on Islam and the ummah. 
To them, the discourse on Islam is therefore 
exclusive only to a certain group of Muslims, 
the ulama with the right education, status, and 
position. Others do not have the right to 
express their opinions on Islam. 
 
 Second, they accuse us of having 
deviated from our faith. They equate our 
questioning and challenging of their 
obscurantist views on women and fundamental 
liberties, and their interpretations of the Qur'an 
as questioning the word of God, and therefore 
they say we doubt the infallibility of God and 
the perfection of the message. Consequently, we 
are accused of being against Islam. They also 
accuse us of using our brains, logic and reason 
(akal) instead of referring to classical exegetical 
and jurisprudential texts of the early centuries 
of Islam. They claim that these texts by the 
great theologians and jurists of centuries past 
have perfected the understanding of Islam and 
the doors of ijtihad should therefore remain 
closed. 
 
 Third, they contend that it is dangerous 
to offer alternative opinions and interpretations 
of the religion as this could confuse the ummah 
and lead to disunity. There can only be one 
interpretation to be decided upon by the ulama 
and all citizens must abide by this 
interpretation. They accuse us of promoting the 
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ideology of “liberal Islam” which is deviant and 
dangerous as it imposes alien ideas onto 
Muslim society.  
 
 However, for us it is ironic that many of 
those who often challenge and question the 
credentials of women’s groups to speak on 
Islam, themselves do not speak Arabic and have 
not been traditionally educated in Islam. Many 
of those at the vanguard of the Islamist 
movement calling for the establishment of an 
Islamic state and supremacy of shariah rule 
today are professionals - engineers, doctors, 
academics, administrators, without any formal 
religious training. Actually, many of them are 
third-rate engineering graduates from third-
rate American universities. (Someone’s got to 
study this correlation). Their right to speak out, 
however, is not questioned. The issue therefore 
is not so much about who has a right to speak 
on Islam, but what is being said about Islam. 
Thus those who echo the mainstream view on 
men’s rights and women’s inferior status in 
Islam, those who believe in the leadership of the 
mullahs, and those who advocate the 
establishment of an Islamic state and imposition 
of Islamic laws, have the right to speak on 
Islam, but those who challenge these views are 
denied the right and legitimacy to speak out. 
 
 The claim made by such Islamist forces 
that only their perspective and interpretation of 
Islam, of its values and its view of human rights 
and women’s rights are the “universal” and 
legitimate view for all Muslims at all times 
must be challenged. In the face of general 
ignorance, fear or indifference by the public at 
large, the obscurantist view of the traditional 
ulama and Islamist activists on issues such as 
women's rights, shariah law and fundamental 
liberties have dominated the Islamic agenda in 
much of the Muslim world, and seen as the 
gospel truth of Islam by the Western world. 
 
 It must be understood that while all 
Muslims accept that the Qur’an as one, the 
human effort in interpreting the Qur’an had 
always led to diverse and differing opinions. It 
is precisely because of this wealth of diversity 
that Islam has survived and flourished to this 
day in different cultures and societies – all could 
accommodate the universal message of Islam. 
And yet in many Muslim societies today, there 
are many who condemn those who offer 
alternative views as infidels and apostates and 
choose to deny or negate the richness, 
complexity and diversity of our heritage. 
 
 There is also a denial of the historical 
context within which the Islamic law itself was 
constructed, and of the consequently historical 
character of the corpus of the Islamic legal 
tradition as it was developed and applied within 
early and classical Islamic civilisation.  
 
 For example, in classical Islamic 
jurisprudential texts, gender inequality is taken 
for granted, a priori, as a principle. Women are 
depicted as “sexual beings” not as “social 
beings” and their rights are discussed largely in 
the context of family law. The classical jurists’ 
construction of women’s rights reflected the 
world in which they lived where inequality 
between women and men was the natural order 
of things and women had little role to play in 
public life. 
 
 But the conservative ulama that 
dominate the religious authorities and Islamist 
activists of today seem unable or unwilling to 
see Islamic law from a historical perspective as 
rules that were socially constructed to deal with 
the socioeconomic and political context of the 
time, and that given a different context, these 
laws have to change to ensure that the eternal 
principles of justice are served. In this process, 
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it is human agency that determines which texts 
are relevant, and how they should be 
interpreted to serve the best interest of the 
community. While the source is divine as it is 
the revealed word of God, human 
understanding of the word of God is a human 
construct that is fallible and changeable in 
accordance with changing times and 
circumstances. Therefore the role of human 
experience and intellect in the pursuit of the 
divine, will lead to the production of Islamic 
knowledge and Islamic laws that cannot then be 
regarded as divine. 
 
 They can therefore be changed, 
criticised, refined and redefined. Unfortunately, 
in the traditional Islamic education most of our 
ulama have gone through, the belief in taqlid 
(blind imitation) and that the doors of ijtihad are 
closed is so strong. This rationale is based on 
the belief that the great scholars of the classical 
period who lived closer to the time of the 
Prophet were unsurpassed in their knowledge 
and interpretative skills. 
 
 But to adopt such an attitude is totally 
untenable in today’s world when we face new 
and different challenges: the issue of human 
rights, of democracy, of women’s rights, the 
challenge of modernity, the challenge of change. 
How do we find solutions from within our faith 
if we do not exert in ijtihad and produce new 
knowledge and new understandings of Islam in 
the face of new problems? 
 
 This problem is compounded by the 
fact that most Muslims have traditionally been 
educated to believe that only the ulama have a 
right to talk about Islam. What are the 
implications to democratic governance, to 
human rights and gender justice, if only a small 
group of people, the ulama, as traditionally 
believed, have the right to interpret the Qur’an, 
and codify the text in a manner that very often 
isolates the text from the socio-historical 
context of its revelation, isolates classical 
juristic opinion especially on women’s issues, 
from the socio-historical context of the lives of 
the founding jurists of Islam, and isolates our 
textual heritage from the context of 
contemporary society, the world that we live in 
today. 
 
 I feel very strongly that the role played 
by civil society groups, such as women’s rights 
and human rights activists, and public 
intellectuals will be key in bringing about 
change in the terms of public engagement on 
Islam in many Muslim societies. 
 
 For this to happen, however, the public 
space to debate on Islam and Islamic issues has 
to open up. Ironically, post-September 11 was a 
wake-up call to many Muslims. One important 
impact in a number of Muslim countries has 
been the opening of the public space for debate, 
for discussion, for a diversity of opinion on 
Islam and Islamic issues to be heard in the 
public sphere, from both Muslims and people of 
other faiths. 
 
 In many parts of the Muslim world and 
within minority Muslim communities, scholars, 
writers, and activists are beginning to debate 
such issues publicly: What is the role of religion 
in politics? Is Islam compatible with 
democracy? Who has the right to interpret 
Islam and codify Islamic teachings into laws 
and public policies? How do we deal with the 
conflict between modern constitutional 
provisions of fundamental liberties and equality 
with religious laws and policies that violate 
these provisions? Should the state legislate on 
morality? Is it the duty of the state, in order to 
bring about a moral society, to turn all sins into 
crimes against the state? Can there be one truth 
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and one final interpretation of Islam that must 
govern the lives of every Muslim citizen of the 
country? Can the massive coercive powers of a 
modern nation-state be used to impose that one 
truth on all citizens? How do we deal with the 
new universal morality of democracy, of human 
rights, of women’s rights, and where is the 
place of Islam in this dominant ethical paradigm 
of the modern world? 
 
 The Arab Spring and the transition to 
democracy, while spewing out undemocratic 
forces to the fore, also provides an opportune 
space for diverse voices to speak out. It is in this 
context that Musawah’s work at the global 
level becomes urgent as we build knowledge 
and build an ever expanding pool of activists 
with the knowledge and courage to stand up, 
speak out and challenge the use of Islam to 
discriminate against women and violate 
fundamental liberties, and offer an alternative 
vision of the possibilities and necessity for 
reform.  
 
 Within the context of modernizing 
Malaysia, Sisters in Islam takes the position 
that if religion is to be used to govern the public 
and private lives of its citizens, then everyone 
has a right to talk about religion and express 
their views and concerns on the impact of such 
laws and policies made in the name of Islam. 
The world is far more complex today then it 
ever was. No one group can have the exclusive 
monopoly on knowledge. In a modern 
democratic nation-state, ijtihad must therefore 
be exercised in concert and through democratic 
engagement with the ummah. The experience of 
others who have been traditionally excluded 
from the process of interpreting, defining and 
implementing Islam must be included. The role 
of women who constitute half of the ummah 
must be acknowledged and included in this 
process of dialogue, of policy-making and law 
making. 
 
 This search for answers to important 
questions on the role of Islam in today’s modern 
nation state cannot remain the exclusive 
preserve of the religious authorities, be they the 
ulama in government or in the opposition 
parties or Islamist activists pushing for an 
Islamic state and shariah law. 
 
 For me the hope for change lies in the 
growing voices of dissent against intolerant, 
oppressive and discriminatory teachings of the 
religion, the opening up of the public space, and 
the breakdown in the monopoly that the 
traditional religious authorities have over the 
discourse on Islam. The democratization 
project in Muslim countries today go must go 
hand in hand with the debate on the public role 
of Islam. You cannot demand for more 
democracy, justice and respect for human rights 
on the one hand in order to get rid of an 
oppressive state, and at the same time demand 
that all these principles stop at the door of 
Islam. That somehow, Islamic law and policies 
cannot, should not be put to the same test that 
you demand of the despotic rulers. Public law 
must be opened to public debate. Even if the 
law is made in the name of religion, it is no 
longer tenable to hide behind the sanctity of the 
divine to silence dissent. 
 
 The challenge is to expand this public 
space, to open up the debate, to turn the 
dissenting voices into a clamor for justice and 
equality, for freedom and dignity at the 
national, regional and international levels. 
Women’s groups in Muslim countries are 
already organizing and building bridges across 
regions to multiply their voices and to take the 
lead in reforming the teachings and 
understanding of Islam to deal with the 
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challenges of the modern world. Musawah is 
already acknowledged as a key international 
actor in this endeavour. For truly, nothing is 
more powerful than an idea whose time has 
come.  
 
 How we live our faith in this world 
remains a work in progress, an exciting work in 
progress actually. The challenge is not just for 
Muslims, but also for Christians, Jews, Hindus, 
Buddhists and all who believe in justice. That 
there is a resurgence of faith in public life is 
obvious. There is a yearning for the 
transcendence, for spirituality, for faith in an 
age of rapid change and all the uncertainties 
and fear of the unknown that change brings. 
 
 As a Muslim, I do not believe that a 
simplistic call to return to an idealized golden 
age of Islam that has little bearing to the 
realities of today's world can be the answer. 
And yet the answers can be found within our 
faith, a faith that is engaged with our lived 
realities, with the human rights principles we 
believe in, and with our constitutional 
framework that recognizes equality and non-
discrimination on the basis of gender.  What we 
need is the intellectual vigor, the moral 
courage, and the political will to strive for a 
more enlightened and progressive 
understanding of our faith in our search for 
answers to deal with our changing times and 
circumstances. For us in Sisters in Islam, this is 
not heretical, but an imperative if religion is to 
remain relevant to our lives,  to be a source of 
peace, and a source of goodness, rather than a 
source of conflict, cruelty and oppression. 
 
 The task is long, difficult and 
challenging; but I believe it is necessary and it 
is possible, and it is exciting. It is a task that we 
as citizens of modern nation-states, of an 
increasingly interdependent globalised world 
must care about and must engage in.  
 
 
 
Zainah Anwar is a founding member and former 
Executive Director of Sisters in Islam, a Malaysian 
non-governmental organisation working on 
women’s rights within the Islamic framework. 
Zainah is currently the Director for Musawah, a 
global movement for equality and justice in the 
Muslim family. She also writes a monthly column on 
politics, religion and women’s rights, called Sharing 
the Nation, in the Sunday Star, Malaysia. She is a 
former member of the Human Rights Commission of 
Malaysia. Her book, Islamic Revivalism in 
Malaysia: Dakwah Among the Students (Pelanduk: 
1987), has become a standard reference for the study 
of Islam in Malaysia.
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